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作者：Harbaugh, WT
作者单位：University of Oregon
摘要：Charities publicize the donations they receive, generally according to dollar categories rather than the exact amount. Donors in turn tend to give the minimum amount necessary to get into a category. These facts suggest that donors have a taste for having their donations made public. This paper models the effects of such a taste for prestige on the behavior of donors and charities. I show how a taste for prestige means that charities can increase donations by using categories. The paper also d...
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作者：Bovenberg, AL; Heijdra, BJ
作者单位：University of Amsterdam
摘要：We study the effects of environmental taxation within the context of an overlapping generations model. The quality of the environment is modelled as a durable consumption good. Introduction of the environmental tax harms old existing generations and benefits young existing generations as well as all future generations. Increasing the tax in a Pareto-improving manner is easier the higher the pre-existing tax. The reverse holds if tax policy is decided by majority rule. A suitably designed bond ...
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作者：Besley, TJ; Rosen, HS
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Princeton University
摘要：A common feature of federal systems is that tax bases are joint property. Consequently, state and federal tax setting decisions are interdependent. Our aim here is to put forward a rudimentary theoretical analysis of this phenomenon, and to use the theory as a framework for econometrically estimating the magnitude of the responses. We find that when the federal government increases taxes, there is a significant positive response of state taxes. For example, a 10-cent per gallon increase in the...
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作者：Corneo, G; Piketty, T
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作者：Cremer, H; Pestieau, P
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Institut Universitaire de France; University of Liege
摘要：This paper presents a political economy approach to payroll tax competition between two countries choosing their respective systems of social insurance in a context of labor mobility. It considers a class of social insurance systems which includes two interesting polar cases: one where benefits are linked to contributions (Bismarck) and one where benefits are flat (Beveridge). The type of social insurance is chosen behind the veil of ignorance at a first (constitutional) stage. In the second s...
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作者：Powers, ET
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：This paper provides empirical evidence on the impact of a welfare program's asset test on the saving behavior of its target population. The approach exploits a policy 'experiment'; the essential federalization of the AFDC program's asset-testing policy in 1981. Data on female-headed households from the National Longitudinal Survey-Young Women are used to test the hypothesis that likely AFDC users adjusted their asset stocks in response to this change. The findings indicate additional saving be...
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作者：Hurley, TM; Shogren, JF
作者单位：Iowa State University; University of Wyoming
摘要：Many contests exist where one player does not know his opponent's value of a fixed prize, e.g. unobservable non-market preferences for preservation. This paper explores how changes in the nature of a one-sided information asymmetry affect effort levels in a Cournot Nash contest. The results indicate that the uninformed player's effort is an uncertain input such that his effort is inversely related to risk. This reduces his average odds of success. Comparative static results are driven by the p...
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作者：Aidt, TS
作者单位：Aarhus University
摘要：This paper derives the characteristics of endogenous environmental policy in a common agency model of politics, and proceeds to show that competition between lobby groups is an important source of internalization of economic externalities. Our analysis generalizes Bhagwati's principle of targeting to the case of distorted political markets. Moreover, we show that the politically optimal structure of environmental taxes incorporates a Pigouvian adjustment. However, since lobby groups care about...
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作者：Drèze, J
作者单位：Delhi School of Economics
摘要：When the unweighted sum of net benefits from a project are used as a criterion of project evaluation, cost-benefit analysis may be sensitive to the choice of numeraire. This is one reason, among others, why this criterion should not be used. There is no plausible alternative to the use of distributional weights. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
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作者：Johansson, PO
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：Brekke [Brekke (1997) Journal of Public Economics 64, 117-123] claims that using money as the numeraire in cost-benefit analysis is systematically favourable to those who value money the least, relative to alternative numeraires. This note attempts to show that the outcome of a properly undertaken cost-benefit analysis is independent of the choice of numeraire. However, since the marginal social utility of income (or, say, an environmental good) is unobservable, one faces a formidable problem ...
