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作者：Goolsbee, A
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：By changing the relative gain to incorporation, corporate taxation can play an important role in a firm's choice of organizational form. General equilibrium models have shown that substantial shifting of organizational form in response to tax rates implies a large deadweight loss of taxation. This paper estimates the impact of taxes on organizational form using data from 1900-1939. The results indicate that the effect of taxes is significant but small. A. corporate rate increase of 0.10 raises...
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作者：Lang, K; Kahn, S
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：Recent research casts doubt on the view that minimum-wage laws reduce employment. We show that in a simple model of bilateral search with heterogeneous workers, a minimum-wage law increases employment. However, the increased competition from higher productivity workers makes lower productivity workers worse off without making higher productivity workers better off. We provide evidence that minimum-wage laws shift employment from adults to teenagers and students. This raises concerns about the ...
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作者：Lee, K
作者单位：University System of Maryland; Towson University
摘要：This paper considers income redistribution in a federal system where regions experience random shacks. Federal redistribution serves as insurance against jurisdiction-specific shocks, but provides a uniform assistance to the poor and cannot suit individual jurisdictions' demands for redistribution, consequently, whether the federal government should redistribute depends on the advantage of pooling the risk and the disadvantage of compromising different preferences for redistribution. With mobi...
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作者：Bisin, A; Verdier, T
作者单位：New York University; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
摘要：We study the formation of preferences for 'social status' as the result of intergenerational transmission of cultural traits. We characterize the behavior of parents with preferences for status in terms of socialization of their children to this particular cultural trait. We show that degenerate distributions of the population (whereby agents have either all status preferences or all non-status preferences) are dynamically unstable. Moreover, under some conditions, there exists a unique statio...
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作者：Moffitt, R; Ribar, D; Wilhelm, M
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; National Bureau of Economic Research; George Washington University; Purdue University System; Purdue University; Purdue University in Indianapolis
摘要：Welfare benefits in the U.S. have experienced a much-studied secular decline since the mid-1970s. We explore a new hypothesis for this decline related to the increase in wage inequality in the labor market and the decline of real wages at the bottom of the distribution: we posit that voters prefer benefits which are tied to low-skilled wages. We test the hypothesis using a 1969-1992 panel of state-level data. An additional contribution of our analysis is the use of General Social Survey data o...
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作者：Glomm, G; Lagunoff, R
作者单位：Michigan State University; Georgetown University
摘要：We study whether 'coercive' public provision or voluntary private provision of public goods can survive when individuals who 'vote with their feet' can choose between communities that differ in the way that public goods are provided. We obtain the following findings: (i) an equilibrium always exists in which all individuals migrate to the community which uses voluntary provision; (ii) under very robust conditions on preferences and income distribution, an equilibrium exists in which all indivi...
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作者：Piketty, T
摘要：Human beings care a lot about being viewed as 'smart'. This paper defines social status as the public beliefs about one's 'smartness' inferred from one's publicly observed social mobility experience. This status motive can easily generate multiple equilibria based upon self-fulfilling beliefs. It also tends to amplify the inequality of economic success between agents with different social origins. This theory of persistent inequality is compared with other theories of inequality based upon sel...
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作者：Chu, CYC; Wang, C
作者单位：National Taiwan University; Academia Sinica - Taiwan
摘要：Suppose the production of x by agent i causes an externality to the production of y by agent j. A prerequisite for the existence of an externality problem is that i and j are not far apart and are separate agents. But an externality-corrective government policy may make j integrate with i, or move away and start producing both x and y. The above reactions by j essentially change the institutional structure and division of labor, and alter the boundary which differentiates what is internal and ...
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作者：Hoyt, WH; Lee, K
作者单位：University of Kentucky; University System of Maryland; Towson University
摘要：We analyze the welfare effects and voting equilibrium with vouchers for private schools. The analysis shows that vouchers, like tuition tax credits [Martinello and West (1988); Frey (1983)], may improve the welfare of all families, including families whose children remain in public schools, if public educational quality is unchanged and publicly-financed educational expenditures decrease. Thus, voters will approve a voucher only if it reduces taxes. When public educational quality is endogenou...
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作者：Bovenberg, AL; Gordon, R
