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作者：Zilcha, I
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：We consider an overlapping-generations economy where the aggregative production process uses physical capital and human capital. Intergenerational transfers from parents to their children are motivated by 'altruism'. We distinguish between two types of transfers: Investment of parents in the education of their offspring, and capital transfer (the 'gift-bequest motive'). We show that the intensity of each type of altruism, and hence the composition of the two types of transfers, affect signific...
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作者：Nishimura, Y
作者单位：Queens University - Canada
摘要：This paper examines the optimal non-linear income taxation problem based on lambda-equitability. An allocation is A-equitable if no agent envies a proportion A of the bundle of any other agent. We examine the properties of Pareto undominated allocations for various lambda-equitability requirements. When there is one output, the marginal income tax rate can increase only if leisure is a luxury. In a multi-commodity model with commodity taxes, the goods preferred by the low skilled agent and/or ...
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作者：Manzini, P; Mariotti, M
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of Exeter
摘要：We present an explicit model of firm-regulator negotiations in a market with several firms. We describe how the regulatory surplus is distributed between firms and regulator, and analyse the impact of various parameters on the resulting level of environmental regulation. Our main result is that a 'toughest firm principle' holds: the outcome of negotiations is essentially determined by the firm with the most aggressive attitude towards environmental control. (C) 2002 Elsevier B.V. All rights re...
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作者：Shiell, L
作者单位：University of Ottawa
摘要：A prescriptive, second-best approach is developed for determining the control of greenhouse gas emissions in an inter-temporal multi-region model of the world. Concerns about inter and intra-generational equity are reflected in the rate of time preference and regional weights of a social welfare function. Choices are narrowed down by the ethical principle of anonymity. A third dimension of equity, inequality aversion, is subject to greater variation. The aggressiveness of recommended abatement...
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作者：Lundberg, S; Startz, R; Stillman, S
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; RAND Corporation
摘要：Evidence from several countries reveals a substantial drop in household consumption around the age of retirement that is difficult to explain with life-cycle models. Using food consumption data from more than 550 households from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for the years 1979-1986 and 1989-1992, we find that married couple households decrease their expenditures on both food consumed at home and away from home by about 9% following the retirement of the male household head. No significant...
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作者：Mohtadi, H; Roe, TL
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Milwaukee
摘要：Does democratization imply faster growth, less corruption and less inefficiency? Past studies yield ambiguous results on the effects of democracy on economic performance and growth. We develop a simple two-sector endogenous growth model that shows both very young and mature democracies grow faster than countries in mid stages of democratization, producing a V effect. This effect results from the pattern of rent seeking as it diverts from the provision of public goods. Rent-seekers act as monop...
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作者：Altshuler, R; Grubert, H
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; United States Department of the Treasury
摘要：Several investment-repatriation strategies are added to the standard model of a multinational in which an affiliate is located in a low-tax country and is limited to two alternatives: repatriating taxable dividends to the parent or investing in its own real operations. In our model, affiliates can invest in passive assets, which the parent can borrow against, or in related affiliates which can be used as vehicles for tax-favored repatriations. We show analytically how the availability of alter...
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作者：Boyer, M; Laffont, JJ
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; Institut Universitaire de France; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Institut Universitaire de France; Universite PSL; Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We consider a regulation problem with complete contracting in a principal-agent model with adverse selection and review within this model the various channels by which external competition parameters affect incentives within the regulated firm. The channels are: the principal's information, the principal's objective function, the agent's incentive constraint, the agent's participation constraint. We consider in particular a better information structure, a threat of liquidation, a fight for tal...
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作者：Rioja, FK
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia State University
摘要：The maintenance of existing public infrastructure has often been neglected in favor of building new infrastructure in developing countries. This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model that analyzes the reasons and effects of such neglect. First, the optimal level of maintenance is shown to depend on the size of new investments as a share of existing public infrastructure and on the productivity of infrastructure. Second, the model is parameterized and solved numerically for a sampl...
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作者：Fredriksson, PG; Svensson, J
作者单位：Southern Methodist University; Stockholm University
摘要：This paper develops a theory of environmental policy formation, taking into consideration the degree of corruptibility and political turbulence. The predictions that emerge are that the interaction between the two variables is important. Political instability has a negative effect on the stringency of environmental regulations if the level of corruption is low, but a positive effect when the degree of corruption is high. Corruption reduces the stringency of environmental regulations, but the e...
