Optimal non-linear income taxation for reduction of envy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nishimura, Y
• 署名单位: Queens University - Canada
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00130-X
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 363-386
• 关键词: Income taxation; envy

摘要

This paper examines the optimal non-linear income taxation problem based on lambda-equitability. An allocation is A-equitable if no agent envies a proportion A of the bundle of any other agent. We examine the properties of Pareto undominated allocations for various lambda-equitability requirements. When there is one output, the marginal income tax rate can increase only if leisure is a luxury. In a multi-commodity model with commodity taxes, the goods preferred by the low skilled agent and/or those with high Hicksian elasticities are taxed more heavily. When preferences exhibit quasi-linearity, we can show that the introduction of the lambda-equitability constraint increases the marginal income tax rates of the entire population. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.