A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Manzini, P; Mariotti, M
• 署名单位: University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of Exeter
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00137-8
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 2725-2736
• 关键词: voluntary agreements; multiperson bargaining; regulation

摘要

We present an explicit model of firm-regulator negotiations in a market with several firms. We describe how the regulatory surplus is distributed between firms and regulator, and analyse the impact of various parameters on the resulting level of environmental regulation. Our main result is that a 'toughest firm principle' holds: the outcome of negotiations is essentially determined by the firm with the most aggressive attitude towards environmental control. (C) 2002 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.