Democracy, rent seeking, public spending and growth
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Mohtadi, H; Roe, TL
署名单位：
University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Milwaukee
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00135-9
发表日期：
2003
页码：
445-466
关键词：
摘要：
Does democratization imply faster growth, less corruption and less inefficiency? Past studies yield ambiguous results on the effects of democracy on economic performance and growth. We develop a simple two-sector endogenous growth model that shows both very young and mature democracies grow faster than countries in mid stages of democratization, producing a V effect. This effect results from the pattern of rent seeking as it diverts from the provision of public goods. Rent-seekers act as monopolistic competitors. Initially, more democracy increases their number, raising aggregate rents. However, rents per rent-seeker fall with the number of rent seekers. Due to this crowding effect and the increased competition among rent seekers, aggregate rents fall in mature democracies. Thus, rents show an 'inverted-U' effect in relation to democracy. We find fairly robust supportive evidence for the latter. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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