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作者：Yakita, A
作者单位：Chukyo University
摘要：This paper examines the growth effects of wage and interest income taxation in an endogenous growth model, which is characterized by diminishing point-in-time returns in human-capital producing technology and overlapping generations of two-period-lived individuals. We show that the greater the long-term learning time of individuals the more individuals inherit human capital from the previous generation. We demonstrate that a flat-rate wage tax stimulates economic growth, while interest income ...
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作者：Blomberg, SB; Hess, GD
作者单位：Claremont Colleges; Claremont Graduate University; Claremont McKenna College; Wellesley College; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：This paper constructs and examines a macroeconomic model which combines features from both real and political business cycle models.-We augment a standard real business cycle tax model by allowing for varying levels of government partisanship and competence in order to replicate two important empirical regularities: First, that on average the economy expands early under Democratic Presidents and contracts early under Republican Presidents. Second, that Presidents whose parties successfully ret...
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作者：Carbonell-Nicolau, O; Klor, EF
作者单位：New York University
摘要：This paper develops a political economy model that is consistent with the fact that democracies have a preference for increasing marginal tax rates on income. We present a model in which there is an exogenous set of political parties with preferences over the set of admissible tax schedules. This set contains virtually any increasing and piecewise linear continuous function. Each party decides whether or not to present a candidate for election. There is a fixed cost of running. The elected can...
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作者：Soares, J
作者单位：George Washington University
摘要：The objective of this paper is to study whether publicly funded education can emerge as a political and economic equilibrium in an overlapping generations economy in which selfish agents vote for public funding of education. The presence of complementarities between capital and labor in the production function implies that, by improving the skills of next period's workers, public funding of education increases the return on capital. As a result, savers will support a publicly financed educatio...
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作者：Finus, M; Tjotta, S
作者单位：Fern University Hagen; University of Bergen
摘要：The increasing number of international environmental agreements (IEAs), and the fact that under some agreements emissions have been reduced beyond agreed targets, are frequently viewed as success stories of international cooperation. We argue that success can only be measured if abatement targets under an IEA are compared with estimated abatement levels in the absence of a treaty, and are evaluated in terms of costs and benefits. We analyze the Oslo Protocol on sulfur reduction, showing that t...
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作者：Wallner, K
作者单位：Oregon State University
摘要：This paper analyzes a hold-up problem in the EU enlargement process. EU-specific anticipatory investments of private firms lower the government's outside option. The EU takes advantage of the applicants' increased dependency and extracts more surplus through entrance conditions that benefit it and impose net costs on applicants. If private firms pay less than the full entrance fee in taxes, enlargement immiserizes the entrant. While in practice an applicant may possess sufficient bargaining po...
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作者：Moro, A; Norman, P
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We consider a model of endogenous human capital formation with competitively determined wages. Discrimination is sustainable in equilibrium in the presence of two distinguishable, but ex ante identical groups of workers. An affirmative action policy consisting of a quota may 'fail' in the sense that there still may be equilibria where groups are treated differently. However, the incentives to invest for agents in the discriminated group are improved by affirmative action if the initial equilib...
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作者：Milligan, K
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of British Columbia
摘要：Contributions to tax-preferred savings accounts are typically constrained by a contribution limit. These limits influence contributions not only for taxpayers currently constrained by the limit, but also for those contributing less than the limit. I develop a simple life-cycle model in which taxpayers exhibit 'use it or lose it' contribution behavior. This connects current contributions to future contribution limits, and implies that an increase in contribution limits can decrease contribution...
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作者：Murdoch, JC; Sandler, T; Vijverberg, WPM
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of Southern California
摘要：This paper represents treaty participation as a two-stage game, for which nations first decide whether or not to participate and then they choose their level of participation. The resulting subgame perfect equilibrium is used to derive a reduced-form equation for estimating and separating the influences of the variables at the two decision stages. This spatial probit equation forms the basis for a full-information maximum likelihood estimator that accounts for the simultaneity bias associated ...
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作者：De Donder, P; Hindriks, J
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
摘要：This paper studies majority voting over quadratic taxation and investigates under which conditions marginal progressivity emerges as a voting outcome. In our model with endogenous income, there is no majority (Condorcet) winning tax schedule. We then investigate less demanding political equilibrium concepts in order to see under which conditions the set of equilibria is composed only of progressive tax functions. We follow three strategies: (i) reduction of the policy space to the tax function...
