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作者：Cremer, Helmuth; De Donder, Philippe; Maldonado, Dario; Pestieau, Pierre
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Universite de Toulouse; Universidad del Rosario; University of Liege
摘要：This paper studies the determination through majority voting of a pension scheme when society consists of far-sighted and myopic individuals. All individuals have the same basic preferences but myopics tend to adopt a short-term view (instant gratification) when dealing with retirement saving and labor supply. Consequently, they will find themselves with low consumption after retirement and regret their insufficient savings decisions. Henceforth, when voting they tend to commit themselves into...
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作者：Dal Bo, Ernesto; Rossi, Martin A.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We investigate the determinants of the efficiency of firms with a focus on the role of corruption. We construct a simple theoretical model where corruption increases the factor requirements of firms because it diverts managerial effort away from factor coordination. We then exploit a unique dataset comprising firm-level information on 80 electricity distribution firms from 13 Latin American countries for the years 1994 to 2001. As predicted by the model, we find that more corruption in the cou...
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作者：Bingley, Paul; Lanot, Gauthier
作者单位：University of Southern Denmark; University of Warwick; Aarhus University; Keele University
摘要：In this paper we study the economic determinants of the joint retirement process of married couples. We propose a tractable dynamic discrete choice model for retirement decisions which allows for non-trivial saving behaviour. We estimate the model on a 1% sample of Danish couples of potential retirement age drawn from a population-based administrative register. The introduction and subsequent reforms of a publicly financed early retirement programme provide us with variation in the data to ins...
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作者：Blomquist, Soren; Gordon, Roger
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作者：Keohane, Nathaniel; Van Roy, Benjamin; Zeckhauser, Richard
作者单位：Yale University; Stanford University; Harvard University
摘要：We consider a class of problems, which we call SFQ problems, in which both stocks and flows can be controlled to promote the quality of a valued resource, such as environmental quality or public infrastructure Under the optimal policy, periodic restoration of the stock of quality complements positive but variable abatement of the flow of damages. When deterioration is more rapid or highly variable, or when abatement is more expensive relative to restoration, the optimal policy relies relativel...
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作者：Bossmann, Martin; Kleiber, Christian; Waelde, Klaus
作者单位：University of Wurzburg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Technische Universitat Dresden; University of Basel; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：This paper examines the role of bequests and of taxation on bequests for the distribution of wealth. We investigate a model with overlapping generations and heterogenous households where parents derive utility directly from their bequests. We obtain all results analytically. Using the coefficient of variation as the measure of inequality, bequests per se diminish the inequality of wealth since they raise private savings and hence average wealth holdings more than the variance of wealth. From a...
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作者：Devereux, Michael P.; Griffith, Rachel; Simpson, Helen
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Oxford; University of London; University College London; University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：We examine whether discretionary government grants influence where domestic and multinational firms locate new plants, and how the presence of agglomeration externalities interacts with these policy instruments. We find that a region's existing industrial structure has an effect on the location of new entrants. Grants do have a small effect in attracting plants to specific geographic areas, but importantly, we find that firms are less responsive to government subsidies in areas where there are...
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作者：Calvo-Armengol, Antoni; Verdier, Thieny; Zenou, Yves
作者单位：ICREA; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universite de Toulouse; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); University of Maine System; University of Maine Orono
摘要：This paper analyzes the interplay between social structure and information exchange in two competing activities, crime and labor. We consider a dynamic model in which individuals belong to mutually exclusive two-person groups, referred to as dyads. There are multiple equilibria. If jobs are badly paid and/or crime is profitable, unemployment benefits have to be low enough to prevent workers for staying too long in the unemployment status because they are vulnerable to crime activities. If, ins...
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作者：Dasgupta, Indraneel; Kanbur, Ravi
作者单位：University of Nottingham; Cornell University
摘要：We investigate how vertical unity within a community interacts with horizontal class divisions of an unequal income distribution. Community is conceptualized in terms of a public good to which all those in the community have equal access, but from which outsiders are excluded. We formulate the idea of redistributive tension, or class antagonism, in terms of the costs that poorer individuals would be willing to impose on the rich, to achieve a given gain in personal income. Our conclusion is th...
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作者：Duffy, John; Ochs, Jack; Vesterlund, Lise
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：Schelling Charitable contributions are frequently made over time. Donors are free to contribute whenever they wish and as often as they want, and are frequently updated on the level of contributions by others. A dynamic structure enables donors to condition their contribution on that of others, and, as Schelling [Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960.] suggested, it may establish trust thereby increasing charitable giving. Marx and Matthew...
