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作者：Higashi, Youichiro; Hyogo, Kazuya; Takeoka, Norio
作者单位：Okayama University; Ryukoku University; Hitotsubashi University
摘要：We examine the behavioral foundation of rational inattention within a menu-choice framework. Unlike previous studies, our approach enables the unique identification of nonadditive information costs. The nonadditivity of information costs makes the effective cost inherently dependent on benefits of information. In contrast to additive cost models, this feature may lead to a violation of the preference for early resolution of menu uncertainty. Early resolution is typically preferable as it allow...
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作者：Perotti, Enrico; Terovitis, Spyros
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We study how a primary need for minimum safety affects investment choices. In addition to risky projects, agents may choose to invest in personal assets they can control. Investing in personal assets serves as self-insurance, as they ensure a higher minimum return but offer a lower expected return than the risky project offers. In autarky, investors ensure a minimum return by personal assets, besides investing in the risky project. Private intermediaries and a safe rate arise endogenously to l...
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作者：Apffelstaedt, Arno
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：I introduce endogenous information disclosure into a model of spontaneous discrimination & agrave; la Peski and Szentes (2013). Individuals in a finite population repeatedly decide whether to engage in profitable interactions with a randomly assigned or chosen partner. Each individual has a fixed physical and a dynamic social color. Social color conveys information about the colors of past partners-but only if that information is disclosed by the decision maker or a random observer. I characte...
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作者：Kraehmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland
作者单位：University of Bonn; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：We study unidirectional incentive compatibility which incentivizes truth-telling by an agent who can misrepresent private information in one direction only. In the canonical setting with quasi-linear preferences and continuous, one-dimensional private information, we show that unidirectional incentive compatibility imposes no restrictions on the allocation rule and revenue equivalence fails. Moreover, unidirectional incentive compatibility holds if and only if the change of the agent's informa...
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作者：Jain, Ritesh; Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele
作者单位：University of Liverpool; University of Turku; University of Naples Federico II
摘要：The paper characterizes the class of two-player social choice functions implementable in rationalizable strategies under complete information.
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作者：Alon, Titan; Fershtman, Daniel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; Emory University
摘要：This paper generalizes the canonical model of human capital accumulation through schooling to endogenize the process of academic specialization. It provides the solution to a class of dynamic investment problems with switching and stopping under sequential uncertainty. Under mild assumptions, the model's optimal policy has a particularly simple form that can be reduced to the comparison of independent indices. The optimal policy implies that schooling should begin with a period of general educ...
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作者：Li, Xuelin; Szydlowski, Martin; Yu, Fangyuan
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We study dynamic Bayesian persuasion in an entry game. A sender publicly reveals information to an adopter and a competitor who decide when to irreversibly enter or exit a market. When the sender's loss from competition is small, the sender first provides information to attract the adopter, and then aims to reveal sufficiently negative information to deter the competitor. Otherwise, the optimal policy is reversed. The sender first aims to provide negative information to deter the competitor an...
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作者：Goto, Hiroshi; Ma, Yan; Takeuchi, Nobuyuki
作者单位：Chiba University; Kobe University; University of Marketing & Distribution Sciences
摘要：We develop a two-sector model to explore how skill distribution affects trade in final goods and offshoring. We show that when countries differ in skill abundance, wage disparities create opportunities for offshoring. In contrast, when countries vary in skill diversity but share the same median skill, symmetric skill distributions render offshoring infeasible. We also find that offshoring can result in the relative price under offshoring being lower than each country's autarky relative price i...
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作者：Dutta, Prajit K.; Radner, Roy
作者单位：Columbia University; New York University
摘要：Climate-related payments have emerged as a contentious and complex issue in climate negotiations. Major questions remain on how this will be done and how effective payments will be. The paper studies transfers under a variety of timing possibilities. It is shown that outcome-contingent payments always lead to efficiency and a particular alignment of transfer and emission timings implies that the efficient equilibrium is the only equilibrium even when the horizon is infinite. The theoretical no...
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作者：Colombo, Luca; Labrecciosa, Paola; Rusinowska, Agnieszka
作者单位：Universite de Rennes; ESSCA School of Management; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We take a novel approach based on differential games to the study of criminal networks. We extend the static crime network game (Ballester et al., 2006, 2010) to a dynamic setting where criminal activities negatively impact the accumulation of total wealth in the economy. We derive a Markov Feedback Equilibrium and show that, unlike in the static crime network game, the vector of equilibrium crime rates is not necessarily proportional to the vector of Bonacich centralities. Next, we conduct a ...
