Climate payments: A Coase theorem
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Dutta, Prajit K.; Radner, Roy
署名单位：
Columbia University; New York University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1016/j.jet.2025.106032
发表日期：
2025
关键词：
摘要：
Climate-related payments have emerged as a contentious and complex issue in climate negotiations. Major questions remain on how this will be done and how effective payments will be. The paper studies transfers under a variety of timing possibilities. It is shown that outcome-contingent payments always lead to efficiency and a particular alignment of transfer and emission timings implies that the efficient equilibrium is the only equilibrium even when the horizon is infinite. The theoretical novelty is a multi-lateral Coase Theorem in a dynamic model. The policy prescription is for an enhanced role for transfers to solve the climate problem.