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作者：Lu, Zhuoran
作者单位：Shanghai Jiao Tong University
摘要：This paper studies a signaling model in which a strategic player can manipulate the cost of signaling. A seller chooses a price scheme for a good, and a buyer with a hidden type chooses how much to purchase as a signal to receivers. When receivers observe the price scheme, the seller charges monopoly prices, and the buyer purchases less than the first best. In contrast, when receivers do not observe the price scheme, the demand for signals is more elastic. In equilibrium, the seller charges lo...
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作者：Smith, Eric
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：This paper assesses wage setting and wage dynamics in a search and matching framework where (i) workers and firms on occasion can meet multilaterally; (ii) workers can recall previous encounters with firms; and (iii) firms cannot commit to future wages and workers cannot commit to not searching in the future. The resulting progression of wages (from firms paying just enough to keep their workers) yields a compensation structure consistent with well established but difficult to reconcile observ...
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作者：Manganelli, Simone
作者单位：European Central Bank
摘要：A decision maker tests whether the gradient of the loss function evaluated at a judgmental decision is zero, for a given level of significance. If the test does not reject, the decision maker selects the judgmental decision. If the test rejects, the decision maker chooses the action whose gradient is at the boundary of the rejection region. The test is admissible and asymptotically most powerful. The level of significance reflects the decision maker's attitude toward uncertainty. The decision ...
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作者：Meng, Dawen
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：This paper discusses a network game in a local-average setup, where players' payoffs depend on the social norms they confront. I focus on an optimal targeting intervention problem, where a planner aims to maximize social welfare by altering individual characteristics ex ante. First, I decompose orthogonally the optimal intervention into the eigenspaces of the social welfare matrix. In what follows, I present the limit forms of the optimal intervention as the budget approaches infinity or zero....
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作者：Cho, In-Koo; Libgober, Jonathan
作者单位：Emory University; Hanyang University; University of Southern California
摘要：This paper examines learning dynamics under non-parametric model uncertainty. We choose the monopolistic profit maximization problem (Myerson (1981)) as our laboratory. We consider a monopolist who chooses a learning algorithm to select a price following a history, facing non-parametric model uncertainty about the probability distribution of the buyer's valuation and bearing the computational cost. We posit that the monopolist has a lexicographic preference over profit and computational comple...
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作者：Khorrami, Paymon; Zentefis, Alexander K.
作者单位：Duke University; Yale University
摘要：We study a multi-location general equilibrium model with financial market segmentation that permits self-fulfilling fluctuations. In a precise sense, such fluctuations are most often redistributive, but their volatility varies systematically with an aggregate latent factor. We thus provide a coordination-based microfoundation for time-varying idiosyncratic risk. A key assumption of our analysis is that cash flow growth rates (e.g., firm profit growth, asset dividend growth, or country output g...
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作者：Gu, Chao; Jiang, Janet Hua; Wang, Liang
作者单位：University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia; Bank of Canada; University of Hawaii System
摘要：We construct a New Monetarist model with labor market search and identify two channels that affect the long-run relationship between inflation and unemployment. First, inflation lowers wages through bargaining because unemployed workers rely more heavily on cash transactions and suffer more from inflation than employed workers; this wage-bargaining channel generates a downward-sloping Phillips curve without assuming nominal rigidity. Second, inflation increases firms' financing costs, which di...
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作者：Delacretaz, David; Loertscher, Simon; Mezzetti, Claudio
作者单位：University of Manchester; University of Melbourne; University of Queensland
摘要：Lindahl prices, set by a fictitious auctioneer with full knowledge of values and costs, are a generalization of Walrasian prices. By making the efficient allocation utility-and profit-maximizing for all players, they induce an efficient outcome in a decentralized way even in the presence of public goods. We study a collective choice model with quasilinear utility, which encompasses the allocation of public and private goods as special cases. We show that each agent's most favorable Lindahl pay...
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作者：Sprumont, Yves
作者单位：Deakin University
摘要：We study the problem of aggregating individual geometric discounting (GD) preferences over infinite streams of consumption profiles into a system specifying, for each consumption history, a social ranking of the streams that follow that history. Such a system is time-consistent if and only if it is generated by a single underlying preference ordering over the lifetime streams. Under the Weak Pareto Principle, Neutrality, Anonymity, and Discounting Irrelevance (individual discount factors do no...
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作者：Carmona, Guilherme; Laohakunakorn, Krittanai
作者单位：University of Surrey
摘要：We analyze a monopoly pricing model where information about the buyer's valuation is endogenous. Before the seller sets a price, both the buyer and the seller receive private signals that may be informative about the buyer's valuation. The joint distribution of these signals, as a function of the valuation, is optimally chosen by the players. In general, players have conflicting incentives over the provision of information. As a modelling device, we assume that an aggregation function determin...
