Spontaneous discrimination with endogenous information disclosure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Apffelstaedt, Arno
• 署名单位: University of Cologne
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106076
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Spontaneous discrimination; repeated games; social norms; Endogenous information disclosure

摘要

I introduce endogenous information disclosure into a model of spontaneous discrimination & agrave; la Peski and Szentes (2013). Individuals in a finite population repeatedly decide whether to engage in profitable interactions with a randomly assigned or chosen partner. Each individual has a fixed physical and a dynamic social color. Social color conveys information about the colors of past partners-but only if that information is disclosed by the decision maker or a random observer. I characterize conditions under which endogenous disclosure supports inefficient equilibria where individuals discriminate by conditioning interactions on the (payoff-irrelevant) colors of potential partners. The analysis shows how competition for being selected as partner interacts with discriminatory norms to create strict incentives for information disclosure, thereby sustaining discrimination that would otherwise break down.