Dynamic information design in an entry game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Li, Xuelin; Szydlowski, Martin; Yu, Fangyuan
• 署名单位: Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106018
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Dynamic information design; Bayesian persuasion; Multiple receivers; entry games; Real options; complementarities

摘要

We study dynamic Bayesian persuasion in an entry game. A sender publicly reveals information to an adopter and a competitor who decide when to irreversibly enter or exit a market. When the sender's loss from competition is small, the sender first provides information to attract the adopter, and then aims to reveal sufficiently negative information to deter the competitor. Otherwise, the optimal policy is reversed. The sender first aims to provide negative information to deter the competitor and then to reveal positive information to attract the adopter. We interpret the optimal policy as inducing hype cycles, and show that hype cycles are more severe in stagnant industries or with higher threat of competition.