FARSIGHTED COALITIONAL STABILITY
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
CHWE, MSY
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1994.1044
发表日期：
1994
页码：
299-325
关键词：
摘要：
I define the largest consistent set, a solution concept which applies to situations in which coalitions freely form but cannot make binding contracts, act publicly, and are fully ''farsighted'' in that a coalition considers the possibility that, once it acts, another coalition might react, a third coalition might in turn react, and so on, without limit. I establish weak nonemptiness conditions and apply it to strategic and coalitional form games and majority rule voting. I argue that it improves on the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set as it is usually defined but is consistent with a generalization of the stable set as in the theory of social situations. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.