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作者：Ehlers, L
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：Moulin (J. Econ. Theory 84 (1999), 41-72) characterizes the fixed-path rationing methods by efficiency, strategy-proofness, consistency, and resource-monotonicity. In this note we give a straightforward proof of his result. Journal of Economics Literature Classification Numbers: D63, D70. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
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作者：Gajdos, T; Tallon, JM
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：We show that, in a two-period economy with uncertainty in the second period, if an allocation is Pareto optimal for a given set of beliefs and remains optimal when these beliefs are changed, then the set of optimal allocations of the two economies must actually coincide. We identify equivalence classes of beliefs, giving rise to the same set of Pareto optimal allocations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D51, D61. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
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作者：Oechssler, J; Riedel, F
作者单位：University of Bonn; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：We show in this paper that none of the existing static evolutionary stability concepts (ESS, CSS, uninvadability, NIS) is sufficient to guarantee dynamic stability in the weak topology with respect to standard evolutionary dynamics if the strategy space is continuous. We propose a new concept, evolutionary robustness, which is stronger than the previous concepts. Evolutionary robustness ensures dynamic stability for replicator dynamics in doubly symmetric games. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
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作者：Jackson, MO; Watts, A
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Southern Illinois University System; Southern Illinois University
摘要：We examine the dynamic formation and stochastic evolution of networks connecting individuals. The payoff to an individual from an economic or social activity depends on the network of connections among individuals. Over time individuals form and sever links connecting themselves to other individuals based on the improvement that the resulting network offers them relative to the current network. In addition to intended changes in the network there is a small probability of unintended changes or...
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作者：Bergemann, D; Välimäki, J
作者单位：Yale University; University of Southampton
摘要：A model of finitely repeated price competition between two sellers with differentiated goods and a large buyer is analyzed. The set of pure strategy sequential equilibria is investigated under public and private monitoring. With private monitoring, i.e., when prices are not observable to the competing sellers, all sales are made by the better seller and the set of repeated game equilibrium payoffs coincides with the stage game subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs. This is in sharp contrast to t...
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作者：Le Van, C; Morhaim, L
作者单位：heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：In this paper we propose a unifying approach to the study of optimal growth models with bounded or unbounded returns (above-below). Following our approach, we prove the existence of optimal solutions and show, without using the contraction method, that the value function is the unique solution to the Bellman equation for a particular class of functions. The value function can be obtained by the usual algorithm defined by the operator provided by the Bellman equation. Moreover, following our ap...
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作者：Nishimura, K; Venditti, A
作者单位：Kyoto University; Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We consider a two-sector economy with positive intersectoral external effects and nonincreasing social returns. We show that if the discount factor p is close to 1 then local indeterminacy may be obtained with mild market imperfections. Moreover, with additional conditions, when p is made smaller the steady state becomes totally unstable and quasi-periodic cycles, along which equilibrium paths are indeterminate, may appear through a Hopf bifurcation. This will be proved even if the investment ...
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作者：Costa-Gomes, MA
作者单位：University of York - UK
摘要：M. Rabin (1994. J. Econ. Theory 63, 374 391) proposes a model of behavior in two-person complete-information games with preplay communication, using non-equilibrium notions in the spirit of rationalizability to derive lower bounds on players' expected payoffs when players have unlimited communication opportunities. This paper adapts Rabin's model so that it can be used to analyze the results of the experiments of R. Cooper et al. (1989, Rand J. Econ. 20. 568 587) on structured preplay communic...
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作者：Blum, Y; Rothblum, UG
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：We first show that in a marriage market, when the stability of a matching is disturbed when a new agent joins the game, natural greedy behavior defines an equilibration procedure that converges to a stable matching for the extended problem. We then consider the iterative procedure under which agents join the game sequentially, and the natural greedy procedure is applied after the entrance of each agent. It is shown that this procedure converges to a stable matching for the original (global) pr...
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作者：Bhaskar, V; Obara, I
作者单位：University of Essex; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We analyze repeated prisoners' dilemma games with imperfect private monitoring and construct mixed trigger strategy equilibria, Such strategies have a simple representation, where a player's action only depends upon her belief that her opponent(s) are continuing to cooperate. When monitoring is almost perfect. the symmetric efficient outcome can be approximated in any prisoners' dilemma game, while every individually rational feasible payoff can be approximated in a class of such games. The ef...
