Timing is everything and marital bliss
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Blum, Y; Rothblum, UG
署名单位：
Technion Israel Institute of Technology
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2001.2885
发表日期：
2002
页码：
429-443
关键词：
摘要：
We first show that in a marriage market, when the stability of a matching is disturbed when a new agent joins the game, natural greedy behavior defines an equilibration procedure that converges to a stable matching for the extended problem. We then consider the iterative procedure under which agents join the game sequentially, and the natural greedy procedure is applied after the entrance of each agent. It is shown that this procedure converges to a stable matching for the original (global) problem and that for each agent, if the order of all other agents is given, he/she weakly improves his/her final outcome by deferring his/her arrival time. The agent that arrives last gets his/her optimal outcome under stable matchings. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).