Equilibria in large games with continuous procedures

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rustichini, A
• 署名单位: University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00168-6
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 151-171
• 关键词: Procedural rationality; Sophisticated agents

摘要

We study existence of equilibria in large games where players use boundedly rational procedures. The equilibria are different from Nash equilibria; the difference persists even when players use procedures for which the observations gathered in any period are used to evaluate the payoff from different actions. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.