Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Matsushima, Hitoshi
• 署名单位: University of Tokyo
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.09.004
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 134-151
• 关键词: large economics; interdependent values; unique implementation; detail-free mechanisms; twice iterative dominance

摘要

This paper investigates unique implementation in large economies with incomplete information and interdependent values; we degenerate the common knowledge assumptions and assume that a central planner is unaware of the specifications of an environment. With a minor restriction on the class of environments, we demonstrate that there exists a detail-free mechanism that virtually implements competitive allocations with complete information in twice iterative dominance, irrespective of how the environment is specified. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.