Learning in games with strategic complementarities revisited

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Berger, Ulrich
• 署名单位: University of Vienna
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.01.007
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 292-301
• 关键词: Fictitious play; Learning process; strategic complementarities; Ordinal complementarities

摘要

Fictitious play is a classical learning process for games, and games with strategic complementarities are an important class including many economic applications. Knowledge about convergence properties of fictitious play in this class of games is scarce, however. Beyond games with a unique equilibrium, global convergence has only been claimed for games with diminishing returns [V. Krishna, Learning in games with strategic complementarities. HBS Working Paper 92-073, Harvard University, 1992]. This result remained unpublished, and it relies on a specific tie-breaking rule. Here we prove an extension of it by showing that the ordinal version of strategic complementarities suffices. The proof does not rely on tie-breaking rules and provides some intuition for the result. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.