Bargaining with endogenous information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dang, Tri Vi
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.09.006
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 339-354
• 关键词: Bargaining; common values; endogenous lemons problem; information acquisition; over-the-counter trading

摘要

This paper analyses information acquisition in ultimatum bargaining with common values. Because of an endogenous lemons problem the equilibrium payoffs of the agents are non-monotonic in the information cost. The mere possibility of information acquisition can cause no trade although the agents maintain symmetric information in equilibrium and the gain from trade is common knowledge. The agent responding to a take-it-or-leave-it offer may capture some or even the full trading surplus in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The implications for sequential bargaining are discussed. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.