Bank incentives, contract design and bank runs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Andolfatto, David; Nosal, Ed
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; Simon Fraser University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.07.011
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 28-47
• 关键词: self-interested banker; private record keeping; bank contracts; Bank runs

摘要

We study the Diamond-Dybvig [Bank runs, deposit insurance. and liquidity, J. Polit. Econ. 91 (1983) 401-419] model as developed in Green and Lin [Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation, J. Econ. Theory 109 (2003) 1-23] and Peck and Shell [Equilibrium bank runs. J. Polit. Econ. 111 (2003) 103-123]. We dispense with the notion of a bank as a coalition of depositors. Instead, our bank is a self-interested agent with a technological advantage in record-keeping. We examine the implications of the resulting agency problem for the design of bank contracts and the possibility of bank-run equilibria. For a special case, we discover that the agency problem may or may not simplify the qualitative structure of bank liabilities. We also find that the uniqueness result in Green and Lin [Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation, J. Econ. Theory 109 (2003) 1-23] is robust to our form of agency. but that the non-uniqueness result in Peck and Shell [Equilibrium bank runs, J. Polit. Econ. 111 (2003) 103-123] is not. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.