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作者：Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Predtetchinski, Arkadi
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：We study a process of bargaining over alternatives represented by points in the unit interval. The paper focuses on the asymptotic behavior of the subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies as the continuation probability approaches one. We give a complete characterization of the limit of the equilibrium proposals as the generalized fixed point of the decumulative distribution of the players' ideal points as induced by the recognition probabilities. In contrast to the existing litera...
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作者：Kubler, Felix; Schmedders, Karl
作者单位：University of Zurich; University of Zurich
摘要：This paper develops a method to compute the equilibrium correspondence for exchange economics with semi-algebraic preferences. Given a class of semi-algebraic exchange economies parameterized by individual endowments and possibly other exogenous variables such as preference parameters or asset payoffs, there exists a semi-algebraic correspondence that maps parameters to positive numbers such that for generic parameters each competitive equilibrium can be associated with an element of the corre...
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作者：Peski, Marcin
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Chicago
摘要：This paper proposes two (ordinal and cardinal) generalizations of [J.C. Harsanyi, R. Selten, A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA and London, 1988] risk-dominance to multi-player, multi-action games. There are three reasons why generalized risk-dominance (GR-dominance) is interesting. Extending the logic of risk-dominance, GR-dominant actions can be interpreted as best responses to conjectures that satisfy a certain type of symmetry. Second, in a local i...
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作者：Al-Najjar, Nabil I.; Sandroni, Alvaro; Smorodinsky, Rann; Weinstein, Jonathan
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Pennsylvania; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：We study the problem of testing an expert whose theory has a learnable and predictive parametric representation, as do standard processes used in statistics. We design a test in which the expert is required to submit a date T by which he will have learned enough to deliver a sharp, testable prediction about future frequencies. We show that this test passes an expert who knows the data-generating process and cannot be manipulated by a uninformed one. Such a test is not possible if the theory is...
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作者：Sanches, Daniel; Williamson, Stephen
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis
摘要：We study the interplay among imperfect memory, limited commitment, and theft, in an environment that can support monetary exchange and credit. Imperfect memory makes money useful, but it also permits theft to go undetected, and therefore provides lucrative opportunities for thieves. Limited commitment constrains credit arrangements, and the constraints tend to tighten with imperfect memory, as this mitigates punishment for bad behavior in the credit market. Theft matters for optimal monetary p...
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作者：Schabert, Andreas
作者单位：Dortmund University of Technology; University of Amsterdam
摘要：This paper examines equilibrium determination under different monetary policy regimes when the government might default on its debt. We apply a cash-in-advance model where the government does not have access to non-distortionary taxation and does not account for initial outstanding debt when it sets the income tax rate. Solvency is then not guaranteed and sovereign default can affect the return on public debt. If the central bank sets the interest rate in a conventional way, the equilibrium al...
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作者：Van Zandt, Timothy
作者单位：INSEAD Business School
摘要：We prove the existence of a greatest and a least interim Bayesian Nash equilibrium for supermodular games of incomplete information. There are two main differences from the earlier proofs and from general existence results for non-supermodular Bayesian games: (a) we use the interim formulation of a Bayesian game, in which each player's beliefs are part of his or her type rather than being derived from a prior; (b) we use the interim formulation of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, in which each pla...
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作者：Jarque, Arantxa
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：I study a problem of repeated moral hazard where the effect of effort is persistent over time: each period's outcome distribution is a function of a geometrically distributed lag of past efforts. I show that when the utility of the agent is linear in effort, a simple rearrangement of terms in his lifetime utility translates this problem into a related standard repeated moral hazard. The solutions for consumption in the two problems are observationally equivalent, implying that the main propert...
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作者：Gilboa, Itzhak; Schmeidler, David
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We suggest a model in which theories are ranked given various databases. Certain axioms on such rankings imply a numerical representation that is the sum of the log-likelihood of the theory and a fixed number for each theory, which may be interpreted as a measure of its complexity. This additive combination of log-likelihood and a measure of complexity generalizes both the Akaike Information Criterion and the Minimum Description Length criterion, which are well known in statistics and in machi...
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作者：Lagos, Ricardo
作者单位：New York University
摘要：I characterize a large family of monetary policies that implement Milton Friedman's prescription of zero nominal interest rates in a monetary search economy with multiple assets and aggregate uncertainty. This family of optimal policies is defined by two properties: (i) the money supply must be arbitrarily close to zero for an infinite number of dates, and (ii) asymptotically, on average (over the dates when fiat money plays an essential role), the growth rate of the money supply must be at le...
