An experiment on learning in a multiple games environment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Grimm, Veronika; Mengel, Friederike
• 署名单位: University of Erlangen Nuremberg; University of Nottingham; Maastricht University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.011
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 2220-2259
• 关键词: Game theory; learning; multiple games; experiments

摘要

We study how players learn to make decisions if they face many different games. Games are drawn randomly from a set of either two or six games in each of 100 rounds. If either there are few games or if extensive summary information is provided (or both) convergence to the unique Nash equilibrium generally occurs. Otherwise this is not the case. We demonstrate that there are learning spillovers across games but participants learn to play strategically equivalent games in the same way. Our design and analysis allow us to distinguish between different sources of complexity and theoretical models of categorization. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.