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作者：Makarov, Igor; Rytchkov, Oleg
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; University of London; London Business School
摘要：We study the properties of rational expectation equilibria (REE) in dynamic asset pricing models with heterogeneously informed agents. We show that under mild conditions the state space of such models in REE can be infinite dimensional. This result indicates that the domain of analytically tractable dynamic models with asymmetric information is severely restricted. We also demonstrate that even though the serial correlation of returns is predominantly determined by the dynamics of stochastic e...
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作者：Fleckinger, Pierre
作者单位：heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Paris School of Economics
摘要：This paper reexamines the issue of relative versus joint incentive schemes in a multi-agent moral-hazard framework. The model allows a full analysis of the information and dependence structure. An important result is that the widespread notion that greater correlation in outcomes calls for more competition is not robust. First, when the dependence structure is effort-sensitive, the optimal incentive scheme in general mixes elements of relative evaluation and joint evaluation. Second, under lim...
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作者：Damiano, Ettore; Hao, Li; Suen, Wing
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of British Columbia; University of Hong Kong
摘要：Two organizations compete for high quality agents from a fixed population of heterogeneous qualities by designing how to distribute their resources among members according to their quality ranking. The peer effect induces both organizations to spend the bulk of their resources on higher ranks in an attempt to attract top talents that benefit the rest of their membership. Equilibrium is asymmetric, with the organization with a lower average quality offering steeper increases in resources per ra...
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作者：Sprumont, Yves
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We study the problem of defining inequality-averse social orderings over allocations of commodities when individuals have different preferences. We formulate a notion of egalitarianism based on the axiom that any dominance between consumption bundles should be reduced. This Dominance Aversion requirement is compatible with Consensus, a version of the Pareto principle saying that an allocation y is better than x whenever everybody finds that everyone's bundle at y is better than at x. We charac...
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作者：Garicano, Luis; Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban
作者单位：Princeton University; Princeton University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We propose a framework to study the impact of information and communication technology on growth through its impact on organization and innovation. Agents accumulate knowledge to use available technologies and invent new ones. The use of a technology requires the development of organizations to coordinate the work of experts, which takes time. We find that while advances in information technology always increase growth, improvements in communication technology may lead to lower growth and even...
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing strategic games: average testing. In this procedure each player sticks to her current strategy if it yields a payoff that exceeds her average payoff by at least some fixed epsilon > 0; otherwise she chooses a strategy at random. We consider generic two-person games where both players play according to the average testing procedure on blocks of k-periods. We demonstrate that for all k large enough, the pair of time-average payoffs converges (al...
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作者：Chakravarty, Satya R.; Zoli, Claudio
作者单位：University of Verona; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
摘要：The objective of this paper is to derive some integer-majorization results for variable-sum comparisons. We use an axiomatic framework to establish equivalence between several intuitively reasonable conditions. (c) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Dybvig, Philip H.; Wang, Yajun
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：Oliver Hart proved the impossibility of deriving general comparative static properties in portfolio weights. Instead, we derive new comparative statics for the distribution of payoffs: A is less risk averse than B iff A's payoff is always distributed as B's payoff plus a non-negative random variable plus conditional-mean-zero noise. If either agent has nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, the non-negative part can be chosen to be constant. The main result also holds in some incomplete markets...
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作者：Abreu, Dilip; Manea, Mihai
作者单位：Princeton University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain over a unit surplus. Players who reach agreement are removed from the network without replacement. The global logic of efficient matchings and the local nature of bargaining, in combination with the irreversible exit of player pairs following agreements, create severe hurdles to the attainment of efficiency in equilibrium. For many networks all Markov perfect equilibria of the bar...
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作者：Krishna, Vijay; Morgan, John
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We compare voluntary and compulsory voting in a Condorcet-type model in which voters have identical preferences but differential information. With voluntary voting, all equilibria involve sincere voting and positive participation. Thus, in contrast to situations with compulsory voting, there is no conflict between strategic and sincere behavior. When voting is costless, voluntary voting is welfare superior to compulsory voting. Even when voting is costly, participation rates are such that, in ...
