Mediated contracts and mechanism design

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Strausz, Roland
• 署名单位: Humboldt University of Berlin
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.005
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 1280-1290
• 关键词: Mediated contracts; mechanism design; revelation principle; Mediation moral hazard; Agency models

摘要

The framework of incentive compatible finite direct coordination mechanisms in the sense of Myerson (1982) [5] is isomorphic to a framework of incentive compatible stochastic mediated contracts in the sense of Rahman and Obara (2010) [11] and Rahman (2009)[10]. The equivalence follows because the framework of Myerson (1982) [5] allows for a correlation between recommendations and transfers. The literature has hitherto not recognized the importance of this correlation for the structure of optimal contracts and for extending the revelation principle to address agency (moral hazard) problems. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.