Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence

• 成果类型: Review
• 署名作者: Yamamoto, Yuichi
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.016
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 1998-2027
• 关键词: Repeated game; private monitoring; conditional independence; Belief-free review-strategy equilibrium; prisoner's dilemma

摘要

This paper proposes and studies a tractable subset of Nash equilibria, belief-free review-strategy equilibria, in repeated games with private monitoring. The payoff set of this class of equilibria is characterized in the limit as the discount factor converges to one for games where players observe statistically independent signals. As an application, we develop a simple sufficient condition for the existence of asymptotically efficient equilibria, and establish a folk theorem for N-player prisoner's dilemma. All these results are robust to a perturbation of the signal distribution, and hence remain true even under almost-independent monitoring. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.