Equivalence of the information structure with unawareness to the logic of awareness

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Heinsalu, Sander
• 署名单位: Yale University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.010
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 2453-2468
• 关键词: Unawareness; awareness; state space models; Modal logic; INFORMATION

摘要

This paper proves the Li (2009) [13] unawareness structure equivalent to the single-agent propositionally generated logic of awareness of Fagin and Halpern (1988) [4]. For any model of one type one can construct a model of the other type describing the same belief and awareness. Li starts from an agent unable to perceive aspects of the world and distinguish states, modeled with subjective state spaces coarser than the objective state space. Fagin and Halpern limit the agent's language or cognitive ability to reasoning only about a subset of the primitive propositions describing the world. Equivalence of these approaches suggests they capture a natural notion of unawareness in a minimal way. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.