How to share it out: The value of information in teams

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gershkov, Alex; Li, Jianpei; Schweinzer, Paul
• 署名单位: Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Surrey; University of International Business & Economics; University of Klagenfurt
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.013
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 261-304
• 关键词: Moral hazard; adverse selection; leadership; teams

摘要

We study the role of information exchange, leadership, and coordination in team and partnership structures. For this purpose, we view individuals jointly engaging in productive processes a team as endowed with individual and privately held information on the joint production process. Once each team member decides on whether or not to share his private information truthfully, he chooses which effort to exert in the joint production process. This effort, however, is not contractible: only the realized output (or profit) of the team can be observed. Our central question is whether or not incentives can be provided to a team in this environment such that team members communicate their private information and exert efficient productive efforts on the basis of this communication. Our main result shows that there exists a simple ranking-based contract that implements both desiderata in a wide set of situations. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.