Common belief foundations of global games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Morris, Stephen; Shin, Hyun Song; Yildiz, Muhamet
• 署名单位: Princeton University; Bank for International Settlements (BIS); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.007
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 826-848
• 关键词: Global games; Risk-dominance; Rank beliefs; higher-order beliefs; rationalizability

摘要

We study coordination games under general type spaces. We characterize rationalizable actions in terms of the properties of the belief hierarchies and show that there is a unique rationalizable action played whenever there is approximate common certainty of rank beliefs, defined as the probability the players assign to their payoff parameters being higher than their opponents'. We argue that this is the driving force behind selection results for the specific type spaces in the global games literature. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.