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作者：King, Robert G.; Thomas, Julia K.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Econometric partial adjustment models perform relatively well at the aggregate level; however, many kinds of microeconomic behavior involve discrete and occasional choices. Analyzing the classic employment adjustment problem, we show how a generalized partial adjustment model tractably accommodates both observations by aggregating the actions of heterogeneous producers facing fixed adjustment costs. Aggregate disturbances cause changes in establishment-level target employment and in the measur...
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作者：Prescott, EC; Ríos-Rull, JV
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：Necessary conditions for equilibrium are that beliefs about the behavior of other agents are rational and individuals maximize. We argue that in stationary OLG environments this implies that any future generation in the same situation as the initial generation must do as well as the initial generation did in that situation. We conclude that the existing equilibrium concepts in the literature do not satisfy this condition. We then propose an alternative equilibrium concept, organizational equil...
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作者：Choi, JP; Thum, M
作者单位：Technische Universitat Dresden; Michigan State University
摘要：This article develops a simple framework for analyzing the links between corruption and the unofficial economy and their implications for the official economy. In a model of self-selection with heterogeneous entrepreneurs, we show that the entrepreneurs' option to flee to the underground economy constrains a corrupt official's ability to introduce distortions to the economy for private gains. The unofficial economy thus mitigates government-induced distortions and, as a result, leads to enhanc...
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作者：De Fraja, G
作者单位：University of Leicester; University of Rome Tor Vergata; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This article shows that reverse discrimination policies can find a justification purely on efficiency grounds. We study the optimal provision of education when households belong to different groups, differing in the distribution of the potential to benefit from education among individuals, which is private information. The main result is that high-potential individuals from groups with relatively few high-potential individuals should receive more education than otherwise identical individuals ...
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作者：Wälde, K
作者单位：Technische Universitat Dresden
摘要：Current explanations for why a growing economy necessarily goes through periods of high and low growth predict countercyclical R&D investment. As this is very controversial from an empirical perspective, a stochastic Poisson model of endogenous growth cycles is presented where the determinants of the cyclical behavior of R&D investment are analytically studied. Providing an explicit expression for the expected length of a cycle shows that high-frequency fluctuations can indeed be understood by...
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作者：Kessler, AS; Lülfesmann, C; Schmitz, PW
作者单位：Simon Fraser University; University of Bonn
摘要：The article studies an adverse selection model in which a contractible, imperfect signal on the agent's type is revealed ex post. The agent is wealth constrained, which implies that the maximum penalty depends on the contracted transaction (e.g., the volume of trade). First, we show that the qualitative effects of the signal can be unambiguously tied to the nature of the problem (e.g., whether the agent is in a buyer or a seller position). Second, the distortions caused by informational asymme...
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作者：Wallace, N
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：An earlier analysis of Cavalcanti and Wallace showing that the set of allocations achievable using outside (government) money is a subset of those achievable using inside (private) money is extended. Here, the class of outside-money allocations is enriched by allowing the planner to make transfers in the form of outside money. At the same time, punishments for defection are weakened. It is shown that the subset result continues to hold, although for a different reason than in the Cavalcanti an...
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作者：Hassler, J; Mora, JVR; Storesletten, K; Zilibotti, F
作者单位：University of Oslo
摘要：This article presents a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model explaining cross-country data on geographical mobility, unemployment, and labor market institutions. Rational forward-looking agents vote on unemployment insurance (UI). Agents with higher moving costs (larger attachment to their location) prefer more generous UI. Attachment is assumed to increase with the duration of residence. UI mitigates incentives for moving and increases, therefore, the fraction of attached agents and th...
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作者：Kahn, CM; McAndrews, J; Roberds, W
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要：An extensive literature in monetary theory has emphasized the role of money as a record-keeping device. Money assumes this role in situations where using credit would be too costly, and some might argue that this role will diminish as the cost of information and thus the cost of credit-based transactions continues to fall. In this article we investigate another use for money, the provision of privacy. That is, a money purchase does not identify the purchaser, whereas a credit purchase does. In...
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作者：Shi, SY
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：In this article, I integrate the microfoundation of monetary theory with the model of limited participation to analyze the competition between nominal bonds and money. The market for government nominal bonds is centralized and Walrasian, whereas the goods market is modeled as random matches. The government imposes a legal restriction that requires all government goods to be purchased with money but not with bonds. By contrast, private agents can exchange between themselves with both money and ...
