Endogenous punishments in agency with verifiable ex post information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kessler, AS; Lülfesmann, C; Schmitz, PW
• 署名单位: Simon Fraser University; University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2005.00365.x
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 1207-1231
• 关键词: limited-liability; Correlated information; asymmetric information; CONTRACTS; incentives; COMMITMENT; auctions; DESIGN; models; WEALTH

摘要

The article studies an adverse selection model in which a contractible, imperfect signal on the agent's type is revealed ex post. The agent is wealth constrained, which implies that the maximum penalty depends on the contracted transaction (e.g., the volume of trade). First, we show that the qualitative effects of the signal can be unambiguously tied to the nature of the problem (e.g., whether the agent is in a buyer or a seller position). Second, the distortions caused by informational asymmetries may become more severe although more information is now available. Finally, the signal can actually serve to increase the agent's informational rents.