Money is privacy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kahn, CM; McAndrews, J; Roberds, W
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2005.00323.x
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 377-399
• 关键词: prisoners-dilemma; social norms; credit; Currency

摘要

An extensive literature in monetary theory has emphasized the role of money as a record-keeping device. Money assumes this role in situations where using credit would be too costly, and some might argue that this role will diminish as the cost of information and thus the cost of credit-based transactions continues to fall. In this article we investigate another use for money, the provision of privacy. That is, a money purchase does not identify the purchaser, whereas a credit purchase does. In a simple trading economy with moral hazard, we compare the efficiency of money and credit, and find that money may be useful even when information is free.