A positive theory of geographic mobility and social insurance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hassler, J; Mora, JVR; Storesletten, K; Zilibotti, F
• 署名单位: University of Oslo
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.0020-6598.2005.00318.x
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 263-303
• 关键词: unemployment-insurance; regional unemployment; LABOR; migration; MARKET; DYNAMICS; earnings; uk

摘要

This article presents a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model explaining cross-country data on geographical mobility, unemployment, and labor market institutions. Rational forward-looking agents vote on unemployment insurance (UI). Agents with higher moving costs (larger attachment to their location) prefer more generous UI. Attachment is assumed to increase with the duration of residence. UI mitigates incentives for moving and increases, therefore, the fraction of attached agents and the political support for UI. This self-reinforcing mechanism can yield two steady-states: one 'European and one American. The former (latter) features high (low) unemployment, low (high) geographical mobility, and high (low) UI.