A theory of esteem based peer pressure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Adriani, Fabrizio; Sonderegger, Silvia
• 署名单位: University of Leicester; University of Nottingham; University of Nottingham
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.03.010
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 314-335
• 关键词: Esteem; status; Peer pressure; signaling; Small fish in a big pond; Conspicuous consumption; Distributional comparative statics

摘要

How does the incentive to engage in social signaling depend on the composition of peers? We find that an increase in the mean peer quality may either strengthen signaling incentives (keeping up with the Joneses) or weaken them (small fish in a big pond). Both right and left truncations of the distribution of peer quality reduce signaling incentives, while more dispersed peer distributions strengthen them. Finally, more right skewed peer distributions strengthen signaling incentives when only a small fraction of the group engage in signaling, but weaken them when signaling is widespread. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.