Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Heller, Yuval; Mohlin, Erik
• 署名单位: Bar Ilan University; Lund University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.011
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 223-247
• 关键词: Evolution of preferences; Indirect evolutionary approach; Theory of mind; Depth of reasoning; deception; EFFICIENCY

摘要

We develop a framework in which individuals' preferences coevolve with their abilities to deceive others about their preferences and intentions. Specifically, individuals are characterised by (i) a level of cognitive sophistication and (ii) a subjective utility function. Increased cognition is costly, but higher-level individuals have the advantage of being able to deceive lower-level opponents about their preferences and intentions in some of the matches. In the remaining matches, the individuals observe each other's preferences. Our main result shows that, essentially, only efficient outcomes can be stable. Moreover, under additional mild assumptions, we show that an efficient outcome is stable if and only if the gain from unilateral deviation is smaller than the effective cost of deception in the environment. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.