Bargaining with a residual claimant: An experimental study

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Embrey, Matthew; Hyndman, Kyle; Riedl, Arno
• 署名单位: University of Sussex; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Maastricht University; Maastricht University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.12.005
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 335-354
• 关键词: Bargaining; Ex-post risk; reference points

摘要

Many negotiations involve risks that are resolved ex-post. Often these risks are not incurred equally by the parties involved. We experimentally investigate bargaining situations where a residual claimant faces ex-post risk, whereas a fixed-payoff player does not. Consistent with a benchmark model, we find that residual claimants extract a risk premium, which increases in risk exposure. This premium can be high enough to make it beneficial to bargain over a risky rather than a risk-less pie. Contrary to the model's predictions, we find that the comparatively less risk averse residual claimants benefit the most from risk exposure. This is because fixed-payoff players' adopt weak bargaining strategies when the pie is risky. We find evidence for a behavioural mechanism where asymmetric exposure to risk between the two parties creates a wedge between their fairness ideas, which shifts agreements in favour of residual claimants but also increases bargaining friction. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.