Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cerrone, Claudia; Hermstruewer, Yoan; Robalo, Pedro
• 署名单位: Middlesex University; Max Planck Society
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.011
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 114-143
• 关键词: Debarment; collusion; procurement auctions; SANCTIONS

摘要

This article presents the first experiment exploring the impact of debarments - the exclusion of colluding bidders - on collusion in procurement auctions. We find that debarments reduce collusion and bids relative to a market with no sanction. The deterrent effect of debarments increases in the length of the punishment. However, shorter debarments reduce efficiency and increase the bids of non-debarred bidders. This suggests that debarments that are too lenient may trigger tacit collusion among the bidders who remain in the market, thereby facilitating the very behavior they aim to deter. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.