Bargaining under a deadline: evidence from the reverse ultimatum game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gneezy, U; Haruvy, E; Roth, AE
• 署名单位: Harvard University; University of Chicago; Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00151-9
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 347-368

摘要

We study a reverse ultimatum game, in which proposers have multiple chances to offer responders a division of some fixed pie. The game ends if the responder accepts an offer, or if, following a rejection, the proposer decides not to make a better offer. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium gives the proposer the minimum possible payoff. Nevertheless, the experimental results are not too different from those of the standard ultimatum game, although proposers generally receive slightly less than half of the surplus. We use the reverse ultimatum game to study deadlines experimentally. With a deadline, the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction is that the proposer gets the entire surplus. Deadlines are used strategically to influence the outcome, and agreements are reached near the deadline. Strategic considerations are evident in the differences in observed behavior between the deadline and no deadline conditions, even though agreements are substantially less extreme than predicted by perfect equilibrium. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.