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作者：Kuang, Zhonghong; Zhao, Hangcheng; Zheng, Jie
摘要：Two privately informed contestants compete in a contest, and the organizer ex-ante designs a public anonymous disclosure policy to maximize the contestants' total effort. We fully characterize ridge distributions, under which the organizer achieves the first-best outcome in equilibrium: the allocation is efficient, and the entire surplus goes to the organizer. When the prior is a mixture of a ridge distribution and a perfectly correlated distribution, the first-best outcome is achievable by a ...
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作者：Brooksby, Austin; Meyer, Jacob; Rentschler, Lucas; Smith, Vernon; Spofford, Robbie
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Cornell University; Utah System of Higher Education; Utah State University; Chapman University System; Chapman University
摘要：Smith and Wilson (2018) argue that behavior in the ultimatum game may be due to the typical implementation, in which players are not given the opportunity to opt out of the game. Using insights from Smith (1759), they suggest that making play voluntary would increase rates of equilibrium play. They conducted an augmented ultimatum game where the responder first decides whether to participate, and compare their experimental data to stylized facts from the literature, reporting far higher rates ...
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作者：Kopsacheilis, Orestis; van Dolder, Dennie; Isler, Ozan
作者单位：Technical University of Munich; Technical University of Munich; University of Essex; University of Queensland
摘要：Conditional cooperation is typically studied in experimental settings where the behavior of others is known to subjects. In this study, we examine conditional cooperation under uncertainty. Using a novel experimental design, we exogenously manipulate the likelihood that a subject's partner in a Prisoner's Dilemma will cooperate. Information about the partner's cooperation is either presented descriptively or learned through experiential sampling. We observe a description-experience gap: subjec...
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作者：Ranjbar, Homa Hosseinzadeh; Feizi, Mehdi
作者单位：Ferdowsi University Mashhad
摘要：For the random assignment problem, we introduce the notion of collusion-proofness that happens if the rule is immune to any collusion on misreporting preferences as it is either not profitable to form or profitable to betray. We characterize collusion-proofnessand prove that an assignment rule is collusion-proof if and only if it is strategy-proof and non-bossy. Therefore, the random serial dictatorship rule is immune to any collusive agreement between agents on preference misrepresentation, t...
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作者：Atay, Ata; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent
作者单位：University of Barcelona; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：We consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. However, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism may not belong to any farsighted stable set. Hence, the TTC mechanism provides an assignment that is not only Pareto efficient but also farsightedly stable. Moreover, looking forward three steps ahead is alread...
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作者：Demange, Gabrielle
作者单位：Paris School of Economics
摘要：Communication between individuals often involves two types of dual activities. On social media such as Facebook, for example, users produce content (posts) and pay attention to their friends' posts. These activities are dual as a user is more inclined to produce posts the more friends react to them and is more inclined to dedicate attention to a friend's posts the more numerous these posts are. This paper builds and analyzes a simple game with dual activities and dedicated attention when agent...
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作者：Song, Yangbo
作者单位：The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
摘要：I study information aggregation among opinion leaders, who have access to private information, observe their predecessor's move, and care about both taking a correct action and maximizing the measure of followers. Potential followers are uninformed agents who care solely about the truth and choose to agree with either the current opinion leader or their predecessor. I find that the distinct incentive of an opinion leader to disagree with their predecessor, although encouraging every individual...
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作者：Xiong, Yifan; Li, Guopeng; Lang, Youze
作者单位：Anhui Normal University; Huazhong University of Science & Technology; Fudan University
摘要：This paper investigates how a monopolist strategically acquires information from networked consumers with correlated preferences using discriminatory or uniform pricing schemes. Under uniform pricing, the optimal information acquisition problem can be efficiently solved in polynomial time by iteratively selecting consumers with the highest Katz-Bonacich centrality. By contrast, under discriminatory pricing, the problem is generally NP-hard. However, in typical networks, such as complete bipart...
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作者：Jalota, Devansh; Ostrovsky, Michael; Pavone, Marco
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with transferable utilities in which money can exchange hands between matched agents, subject to distributional constraints on the set of feasible allocations. In such markets, we establish that equilibrium arrangements are surplus-maximizing and study the conditions on the distributional constraints under which equilibria exist and can be computed efficiently when agents have linear preferences. Our main result is a linear programming duality me...
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作者：Sethi, Ravideep; Verriest, Ewout
作者单位：Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We consider an infinitely repeated legislative bargaining model with a dynamically evolving status quo. Three players, one of whom is permanently endowed with veto power, must split a fixed budget in each period. Despite her additional power, the veto player cannot always asymptotically extract the full surplus. The non-veto players endogenously prevent each other's expropriation when they are patient and have high initial allocations in the unique stationary, symmetric, stageundominated, coal...
