Credibility of group manipulation in random assignments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ranjbar, Homa Hosseinzadeh; Feizi, Mehdi
• 署名单位: Ferdowsi University Mashhad
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.016
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 27-33
• 关键词: Random assignment problem; Group strategy-proofness; Group manipulation; collusion-proofness

摘要

For the random assignment problem, we introduce the notion of collusion-proofness that happens if the rule is immune to any collusion on misreporting preferences as it is either not profitable to form or profitable to betray. We characterize collusion-proofnessand prove that an assignment rule is collusion-proof if and only if it is strategy-proof and non-bossy. Therefore, the random serial dictatorship rule is immune to any collusive agreement between agents on preference misrepresentation, though it is not (weakly) group strategy-proof. This result gives us a possibility between collusion-proofness, ex-post Pareto efficiency, and equal treatment of equals. Furthermore, we proved that a large family of strategy-proof mechanisms called rank exchange mechanisms, & agrave; la Shende and Purohit (2023), are collusion-proof but group manipulable.