School choice with farsighted students

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Atay, Ata; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent
• 署名单位: University of Barcelona; Universite Catholique Louvain
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.010
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 148-163
• 关键词: School choice; Top trading cycle; Stable sets; Farsighted students

摘要

We consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. However, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism may not belong to any farsighted stable set. Hence, the TTC mechanism provides an assignment that is not only Pareto efficient but also farsightedly stable. Moreover, looking forward three steps ahead is already sufficient for stabilizing the matching obtained from the TTC. In addition, we show that variations of TTC that improve in terms of no justified envy are farsightedly stable, but may require more farsightedness on behalf of students.