lSimple collusive agreements in one-shot first-price auctions
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Kivetz, Gil; Tauman, Yair
署名单位：
Tel Aviv University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.020
发表日期：
2010
页码：
138-149
关键词：
摘要：
The paper demonstrates that collusion in a private value first price auction is likely to occur even in a one shot interaction. The strategies of the colluding parties must be mixed since agreeing to submit a bid equal to the reservation price of the seller provides the incentive for that bidder to cheat on the designated winner. We deal with a complete information environment with arbitrary number of bidders. We characterize the sensible equilibrium outcome where the two bidders with the highest valuations collude. We show that the equilibrium outcome is unique and that the probability of collusion exceeds 1/2. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.