Costly network formation and regular equilibria

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: De Sinopoli, Francesco; Pimienta, Carlos
• 署名单位: University of New South Wales Sydney; University of Verona
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.12.004
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 492-497
• 关键词: Network-formation games; regular equilibrium; Stable sets

摘要

We prove that for generic network-formation games where players incur a strictly positive cost to propose links the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all Nash equilibria are regular and, therefore, stable sets. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.