Voting to persuade ☆

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wong, Tsz-Ning; Yang, Lily Ling; Zhao, Xin
• 署名单位: University of Barcelona; University of Mannheim; University of International Business & Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.007
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 208-216
• 关键词: Advisory committee; persuasion; voting

摘要

We consider a model of collective persuasion, in which members of an advisory committee with private continuous signals vote on a policy change. A decision maker then decides whether to adopt the change upon observing each vote. Information transmission between the committee and the decision maker is possible if and only if there exists an informative equilibrium in which the decision maker only adopts the policy change after a unanimous vote. Similarly, full information aggregation is achievable if and only if such an equilibrium exists when the size of the committee is large enough. We further discuss why our continuous -signal model produces results different from discrete -signal models.