Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; Weidenholzer, Simon
• 署名单位: University of Cologne; University of Essex
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.013
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 397-411
• 关键词: Minimum effort games; Local interactions; learning; imitation

摘要

We consider minimum-effort games played in an arbitrary network. For a family of imitation behavioral rules, including Imitate the Best and the Proportional Imitation Rule, we show that inefficient conventions arise independently of the interaction structure, if information is limited to the interaction neighborhoods. In the presence of information spillovers, we provide a condition on the network structure that guarantees the emergence of efficient conventions. In contrast, if this condition is violated we will observe inefficient conventions, even in the presence of information spillovers. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.