All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Minchuk, Yizhaq; Sela, Aner
• 署名单位: Sami Shamoon College of Engineering; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.09.006
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 130-134
• 关键词: Contests; All-pay auctions; Uncertain prizes

摘要

We study all-pay auctions with multiple prizes. The players have the same value for all the certain prizes except for one uncertain prize for which each player has a private value. We characterize the equilibrium strategy and show that, independent of the ranking of the uncertain prize, if the uncertain prize is not the lowest one, a player's effort as well as his expected payoff increase in his value for the uncertain prize. Otherwise, if this prize is the lowest one, we obtain that a player's effort may decrease in his value for the uncertain prize but his expected utility increases. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.