The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Morton, Rebecca B.; Piovesan, Marco; Tyran, Jean-Robert
• 署名单位: University of Copenhagen; University of Copenhagen; University of Vienna
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.008
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 461-481
• 关键词: Voting; information aggregation; Cognitive biases; Wisdom of crowds; social information

摘要

We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a dark side, that is, result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. In line with theoretical predictions, information on the popularity of policy choices is beneficial when a minority of voters is biased, but harmful when a majority is biased. In theory, information on the success of policy choices elsewhere de-biases voters and alleviates the inefficiency. However, in the experiment, providing social information on success is ineffective and does not sufficiently de-bias voters. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.