On Dynamic Pricing

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Krasikov, Ilia; Lamba, Rohit
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Cornell University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220124
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Mechanism design

摘要

This paper builds a theory of dynamic pricing for the sale of timed goods. The main friction is private and evolving valuation of the buyer prior to the date of consumption, which follows a Poisson process. A combination of membership fees and continuously increasing prices induces a threshold response from the buyer, endogenously segmenting the market along timing of purchase. This pricing mechanism achieves the deterministic global optimum. The tools developed here are shown to be useful in thinking about global incentives in dynamic mechanisms, and mapping dynamic pricing to the classic taxonomy of consumer-producer surplus and deadweight loss. (JEL D21, D82, D86)