Simple Manipulations in School Choice Mechanisms†

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shirakawa, Ryo
• 署名单位: University of Tokyo; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230116
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: TRUNCATION STRATEGIES; deferred acceptance; college admissions; allocation; MONOTONICITY; assignment; STABILITY; proofness; axioms

摘要

Market design mechanisms are often required to be strategy proof, ensuring that no misreporting is profitable. This, however, may be overly restrictive: Real-world participants may be unable to engage in complex misreporting. In the context of school choice, this paper proposes that mechanisms ought to be immune only to certain simple misreports. While no strategy-proof mechanism Pareto improves on the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism, we find one under our weaker requirement: Kesten's (2010) efficiency adjusted DA (EADA). By extending our criterion to also prevent simple collective misreports, we obtain characterizations of Kesten's mechanism. These insights contribute to practical market design.