Sequential Kidney Exchange

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Morrill, Thayer
• 署名单位: University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; North Carolina State University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.3.265
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 265-285
• 关键词: paired donation; chain

摘要

The traditional literature on kidney exchange assumes that all components of the exchange must occur simultaneously. Unfortunately, the number of operating rooms required for concurrent surgeries poses a significant constraint on the beneficial exchanges that may be attained. The basic insight of this paper is that incentive compatibility does not require simultaneous exchange; rather, it requires that organ donation occurs no later than the associated organ receipt. Using sequential exchanges may relax the operating room constraint and thereby increase the number of beneficial exchanges. We show that most benefits of sequential exchange can be accomplished with only two concurrent operating rooms.